Level-1 consensus is a property of a preference profile. Intuitively, it means that there exists some preference relation such that, when ordering the other preference-relations by increasing distance from it, the closer preferences are more frequent in the profile. This is a desirable property, since it enhances the stability of the social choice by guaranteeing that there exists a Condorcet winner and it is elected by all scoring rules.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, Mahajne et al. [9] have proposed the concept of level-1 consensus of a preference profile showing that it considerably enhances the stability of social choice. In particular, if a preference profile exhibits level-1 consensus around a given preference relation 0 with respect to the inversion metric, then:
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• There exists a Condorcet winner;
• The Condorcet winner is chosen by all the scoring rules;
• With an odd number of individuals, the majority relation is transitive and equals 0 .
The current study focuses on two questions:
1. How can a preference profile be tested for level-1 consensus?
How likely is it that level-1 consensus exists?
Questions of the former type have been recently studied with respect to various domain restrictions. For example, Escoffier et al. [5] provide an efficient way to check whether a preference profile is single-peaked, Bredereck et al. [3] provide an efficient way to check whether a preference profile is single-crossing, and Barberà and Moreno [1] ask whether the satisfaction of their proposed top monotonicity condition (a sufficient condition for an extension of the median-voter theorem to hold) is easy to check.
Questions of the latter type have been studied in the social choice literature with respect to various domain restrictions that guarantee social stability, e.g., the existence of Condorcet winners under the majority rule [6, 14] .
Our answer to the first question is an efficient algorithm for determining whether a preference profile exhibits level-1 consensus. In case of such consensus, we further identify the preference relations around which it occurs.
Our answer to the second question is that level-1 consensus is highly improbable. We applied our algorithm on a recently-released dataset of 315 real-world preference-profiles from 1 In fact, Mahajne et al. [9] define a family of conditions called level-r consensus, where r is an integer between 1 and K!/2 and K is the number of alternatives. But for the sake of simplicity, in the present paper we focus on level-1 consensus which is the strongest condition in this family.
Note that recently Poliakov [13] proved that level-r consensus is equivalent to level-1 consensus whenever r ≤ (K − 1)!.
2 various sources [12] and found that none of them exhibits level-1-consensus. Moreover, experiments performed on thousands of profiles generated randomly according to Mallows' phi model [10] revealed that, for a wide range of parameter settings, profiles exhibiting level-1 consensus were rare. To support these findings, we prove that under the standard probabilistic setting of equally-probable preference relations, the probability of level-1 consensus goes to zero when the number of individuals is sufficiently large.
Motivated by these results, we established that the level-1 consensus property can be weakened, enhancing the stability of social choice. Applying the modified algorithm to the above mentioned dataset, it has been found that 39 out of 315 profiles exhibit level-1 consensus. The weaker level-1 consensus property is also much more probable in the settings of randomly-generated profiles we tested. In particular, under the impartial assumption the probability of the weaker level-1 consensus property converges to a positive number for any number of individuals.
II. DEFINITIONS
Let A = {a 1 , . . . , a K } be a set of K ≥ 3 alternatives and let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of individuals. Also, let P be the subset of complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relations on A. We will refer to the elements of P as preference relations or simply as preferences. A preference profile or simply a profile is a list π = ( 1 , . . . , n ) of preference relations on A such that for each i ∈ N , i is the preference relation of individual i. We denote by P n the set of all possible preference profiles.
Let π = ( 1 , . . . , n ) be a preference profile. For each preference ∈ P, let µ π ( ) := |{i ∈ N : i = }| = the number of individuals whose preference is , which in this study is referred to as the frequency of .
the number of pairs of alternatives that are ranked differently by the two preferences, i.e, the number of sets {a, b} ⊆ A such that a b and b a or vice-versa.
It is known that the inversion-distance is a metric on P [7] . It is clear from the definition that the inversion distance can vary between 0 and Definition 2. Let and be two different preference relations on A, and let 0 ∈ P be a preference relation on A. We say that is closer than
Definition 3. Let 0 ∈ P. A preference profile π ∈ P n exhibits consensus of level-1 around 0 if the following two conditions hold:
1. For all pairs of preference relations , ∈ P, ≥ 0
2. There is at least one pair , ∈ P, such that > 0 and µ π ( ) > µ π ( ).
III. OPERATIVE TEST FOR LEVEL-1 CONSENSUS
Given a preference profile π ∈ P n , we would like to check whether there exists some preference relation 0 such that π exhibits level-1 consensus around it. Our operative test relies on the observation that the two conditions in Definition 3 are equivalent to the following:
There exists a pair , such that µ π ( ) > µ π ( ).
Our operative test proceeds in several steps.
First, we calculate the frequency µ π ( ) of each of the preferences ∈ π. Let n be the number of distinct preferences in π. Note that n ≤ n and also n ≤ K!, since with K alternatives there are at most K! possible preferences. Now Condition 2 is easily checked: it is satisfied if-and-only-if (a) there exists a pair of preferences in π with different frequencies, or (b) n < K! (since this implies that there exists a preference not in π with frequency 0).
If Condition 2 is satisfied, it only remains to check whether Condition 1 is satisfied as well.
We order the preferences in descending order of µ π ( ), and rename them 1 , 2 , . . . , n , 
Now we can directly check Condition 1. This condition should be checked separately for each candidate preference 0 . Given a candidate, we can calculate its inversion-distance from each preference i ∈ π , d( i , 0 ). Now, we represent the profile π relative to 0 in the form of a scatter-plot, which will lead to a straight-forward assessment of the profile's consensus status. Our scatter-plot is a plot whose x-axis denotes the distance d( i , 0 ) and whose y-axis denotes the frequency µ π ( i ). Notice that there may be several different preference relations i with the same frequency, µ π ( i ) = m. Therefore, for each integer value on the y-axis of the scatter-plot, m, we may have several corresponding values on the x-axis, which can be represented by a horizontal segment whose maximum and minimum borders are given by max i:
Condition 1 above requires that, for every two frequencies m 1 > m 2 , all preferences with frequency m 1 are closer to 0 than all preferences with frequency m 2 : max i: distance are ordered arbitrarily. Under this ordering, the following lemma holds: Lemma 1. If condition 1 is violated for any pair of preference relations in π, then it is violated for an adjacent pair i , i+1 for some i.
The lemma is easy to understand based on the graphical criterion outlined above. A formal proof is provided in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 implies that in order to ensure that Condition 1 is satisfied for all preferences in π, it is sufficient to scan the ordered list of preferences from 1 to n , and check if there
If Condition 1 holds for all preferences in π, it remains to check that it holds for preferences not in π, i.e, preferences with zero frequency. Let D = d( n , 0 ) be the largest distance of a
Therefore, we have to check that the distances between 0 and preferences not in π are all larger than D. Equivalently, we can ensure that all preferences with distance at most D are in π. This can be checked by calculating the number of possible preferences with distance at most D and verifying that it is equal to the total number n of preferences in π. Since this number involves all possible preferences, it does not depend on the candidate 0 . Therefore, we can calculate this number assuming w.l.o.g that 0 is the identity permutation 1, . . . , K.
Then, n is the number of permutations on K elements with at most D inversions (out-of-6 order elements). This can be written as:
where T (k, j) is the number of permutations on K elements with exactly j inversions.
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The number T (K, j) can be calculated using the following recurrence relation 3 :
• T (K, 0) = 1: there is exactly one permutation with zero inversions -the identity permutation.
• T (0, j) = 0: there are no permutations with 0 elements.
For any permutation of 1, . . . , K with j inversions, let i be the number of elements that come after element K in that permutation.
Since K is larger than all other elements, there are exactly i inversions involving K.
Therefore, if we remove K, we get a permutation of 1, . . . , K − 1 with exactly j − i inversions. By summing the counts of these permutations for all possible values of i
To summarize, we formally present our algorithm using two procedures.
Procedure Check Consensus(π):
1. Calculate the frequency µ π ( ) of each preference ∈ π.
2. Define K = number of alternatives, n = number of distinct profiles in π.
3. If all frequencies are equal and n = K!, return "no consensus; Condition 2 violated".
4. Order the preferences by descending frequency:
5. Set M := µ π ( 1 ) to be the maximum frequency of a preference relation.
If Condition 1 Is Satisfied(π, j ), then return j .
7. Return "no consensus; Condition 1 is violated for all candidates".
Procedure Condition 1 Is Satisfied(π, 0 ):
Within every group of preferences with the same frequency, order the preferences by ascending inversion-distance from 0 .
2. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1:
We now analyze the run-time of the above algorithm.
In procedure Condition 1 Is Satisfied, we have to calculate the distance between 0 and each of the other n −1 preferences. Calculating the inversion distance between a given pair of preferences can be done by a recently-developed algorithm [4] with runtime of O(K √ log K).
We then have to order the n distinct preferences and then scan them from top to bottom.
Ordering n items can be done in time O(n log n ). The value of n is at most the maximum of n (the number of voters) and K! (the number of possible preferences). So the run-time
bound is relevant when the number of alternatives is small relative to the number of voters (K! ≤ n) and the latter when it is large (K! > n).
As will be explained below, the probability of having two preferences with exactly the same frequency is low, so in most cases we will have to run the procedure Condition 1 Is Satisfied only once. However, in the improbable case in which there are many preferences with the same frequency, it would have to run at most n times. Therefore, the
IV. PROBABILITY OF LEVEL-1 CONSENSUS
Equipped with a procedure for checking level-1 consensus, we set out to check how likely is this property in various settings. We conducted several simulation experiments.
In the first experiment we used the PrefLib database [12] , an online database of real-world preference-profiles collected from various sources. This database includes 315 full preference profiles, with different numbers of alternatives and voters; see Table I for statistics. For each preference profile, we used the algorithm described in the previous section to check whether there exists a 1-level consensus. The results were striking: none of the 315 profiles exhibited a level-1 consensus.
In the second experiment we used preference-profiles that were generated according to Mallows' phi model [10] , which was claimed to favor level-1 consensus [9] . Mallows' model assumes that there is a "correct" preference * , and the actual preferences of the voters are noisy variants of it. The probability of a preference depends on its inversion distance from the correct preference: d( , * ). The strength of this dependence is determined by a parameter φ ∈ (0, 1], where lower φ means higher dependence; when φ → 0 the preferences of all voters are identical and equal to * , while when φ = 1 the preference of each voter is selected uniformly at random from the K! possible orderings on K items. In general, the probability of each preference-relation is given by [8] :
where Z is a normalization factor.
We considered all 6 combinations of K ∈ {3, 4, 5} alternatives and n ∈ {100, 1000} voters, Why is level-1 consensus so rare? Intuitively, the reason is that it requires preferences to have exactly the same frequency in the population. Condition 1 implies that if
For every K ≥ 3 and for every candidate 0 , there exist at least two preferences with the same distance from the candidate,
Hence, a necessary condition for level-1 consensus is that there exist at least two preferences with exactly the same frequency. The probability of this event goes to 0 as the number of voters goes to ∞.
Below we present an approximate asymptotic upper bound on the probability of level-1 consensus for the case φ = 1. This is the case of impartial culture, in which all K! preferences are equally probable. Let 0 be the fixed preference
the number of distinct preferences whose inversion-distance from 0 is exactly d. Since d varies between 0 and
) profiles have exactly the same frequency. Let P (n, K, d) be the probability that, with n voters and K alternatives, all profiles with distance d from 0 will have the same frequency. Then, the probability of having level-1 consensus is at most:
Under the impartial culture assumption, the frequency of a profile is a random variable distributed like Binom[n, 1/K!]. Its mean value is µ = n/K! and its standard deviation is
We make the following simplifying assumptions:
1. The number of voters n is sufficiently large so that the binomial variable can be approximated by a normal random variable distributed like Normal[µ, σ].
2. The frequencies of different profiles are independent random variables (in fact, the frequencies are dependent. The sum of all frequencies must equal n, so when the frequency of one preference is higher, it is more likely that the frequency of another preference will be lower. However, we are interested in the probability that two variables are equal, which should not be much affected by this dependence).
Under these assumptions, P (n, K, d) can be estimated as the probability that
normal random variables will have the same value x, when x is integrated between −∞ and ∞:
And their product is: 5 We are grateful to Hernan J. Gonzalez for his help in solving this problem.
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This expression depends on n only through σ. Hence, to get an asymptotic approximation for how P (n, K) changes as a function of n, we remove the factors that do not depend on n:
and get:
Recall that P (n, k) is the probability of level-1 consensus around a fixed preference; the probability of level-1 consensus around any preference is, by the union bound, at most this probability times the number of possible preferences, i.e,
For example, with K = 3 alternatives we get an upper bound of 6/ (n/6) 2 = O(1/n); with K = 4 alternatives the upper bound is 24/ (n/24) 17 = O(1/n 8.5 ). In any case, the upper bound goes to 0 when n → ∞, and the rate of convergence to 0 becomes much faster when K is larger.
V. A WEAKER BUT MORE PROBABLE VARIANT OF LEVEL-1 CONSENSUS
Motivated by the low probability for a level-1 consensus, we suggest below a weakened variant of this property, where Condition 1 is replaced with:
It will be shown below that changing
icantly increases the probability that the condition is satisfied, while keeping the desirable stability properties of the original condition. Moreover, these stability properties hold even without Condition 2. 6 Our proofs below closely follow the proofs of [9] . Their proofs are stated for level-r consensus for general r, and indeed Condition 1' can also be adapted to general r, but for the sake of simplicity we prefer to focus on the case r = 1. Given a preference-profile π, define the majority relation M π as follows: aM π b iff, in a vote between a and b, a beats b by a weak majority. I.e, the number of preferences in π by which a b is at least as large as the number of preferences in π by which b a.
Lemma 2. Let π ∈ P n be a preference-profile and 0 ∈ P a preference-relation such that Condition 1' is satisfied. Then, for any two alternatives a, b, if a 0 b then aM π b.
Moreover, if n is odd then the opposite is also true: if aM π b then a 0 b.
Proof. =⇒ : Suppose that a 0 b. Partition P, the set of K! possible preferences, to two subsets:
• The subset C(a > b) containing the K!/2 preferences for which a b;
• The subset C(b > a) containing the K!/2 preferences for which b a. By Condition 1', this implies that µ π (w ab ( )) ≥ µ π ( ). So for every preference by which b is preferred to a, there is a preference w ab ( ) by which a is preferred to b, which is at least as frequent. Therefore, a beats b by a weak majority: aM π b.
Let
⇐= : When n is odd, every majority is strict. Hence, if aM π b then it is not true that bM π a. Hence, by the first part of the lemma, it is not true that b 0 a. Since 0 is a complete ranking, a 0 b.
We denote by Best( 0 ) the alternative ranked first according to 0 .
A Condorcet winner of π is an alternative a that beats all other alternative by a weak majority, i.e, for any other alternative b, aM π b.
Theorem 1. Let π ∈ P n be a preference-profile and 0 ∈ P a preference-relation such that Condition 1' is satisfied. Then Best( 0 ) is a Condorcet winner of π.
Moreover, if n is odd then 0 coincides with the majority relation M π , and 0 is the unique preference in P for which Condition 1' is satisfied.
Proof. Let a 1 := Best( 0 ). So for every b = a, a 1 0 b. By Lemma 2, this implies that
When n is odd, Lemma 2 implies that a 0 b iff aM π b, so 0 ≡ M π . This is true for any preference in P for which Condition 1' holds, so any such preference coincides with 0 .
A scoring rule is a rule characterized by a vector S of K scores, S 1 ≥ · · · ≥ S K . Given a profile π, for each preference ∈ π, the rule assigns score S 1 to the alternative ranked first by , S 2 to the alternative ranked second by , and so on. The rule then sums the scores assigned to each alternative by all preferences in π, and selects the alternative/s that received the highest total score.
Lemma 3. Let π ∈ P n be a preference-profile and 0 ∈ P a preference-relation such that Condition 1' is satisfied. Then, for any two alternatives a, b and any scoring-rule S, if a 0 b then the score of a is at least as large as the score of b.
Proof. Partition P to two halves, C(a > b) and C(b > a), and define the bijection w ab between them, as in the proof of Theorem 1.
14 For every scoring-rule S and preference ∈ P, define ∆ S ( ) as the difference between the score of a in and the score of b in . So:
• For every preference ∈ C(a > b), ∆ S ( ) is weakly-positive.
• For every preference ∈ C(b > a), ∆ S ( ) is weakly-negative.
• For every preference ∈ P, ∆ S ( ) = −∆ S (w ab ( )).
Given the scoring-rule S and the profile π, define ∆ S (π) as the difference between the total score of a in π and the total score of b in π. Then, by definition:
Since a 0 b, for every preference ∈ C(a > b), the lemma in Appendix B implies that
Hence, all terms in the last sum are weakly-positive. Hence, ∆ S (π) ≥ 0 and the lemma is proved.
Theorem 2. Let π ∈ P n be a preference-profile and 0 ∈ P a preference-relation such that Condition 1' is satisfied. Then every scoring-rule assigns a highest total score to Best( 0 ).
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 3.
The procedure for checking Condition 1' is very similar to the one for checking Condition 1 in Section III. There are two differences: the inequality that causes the procedure to fail is
, and in the last step we have to check that no preference outside π has distance less than D (instead of less-than-or-equal-to
Procedure Condition 1' Is Satisfied(π, 0 ):
Order preferences with the same frequency by ascending inversion-distance from 0 .
3. Set D := d( n , 0 ). Set n * to the number of profiles in π whose distance to 0 is at
Else, return False.
We applied the modified procedure to the same experimental settings described in Section IV and estimated the probability of having the weakened level-1-consensus. Out of the 315
PrefLib profiles, 39 exhibit weak level-1 consensus. All 39 profiles are from the dataset labeled "ED-00004 1-100", where all profiles have 3 alternatives. This means that 39% of all profiles with 3 alternatives exhibited the weak level-1 consensus (in contrast to 0 which exhibit level-1 consensus).
The results of the experiments on random profiles are shown in Figure 2 ; it is evident that in all settings, including the most difficult setting of impartial culture (φ = 1), weak level-1-consensus is substantially more probable than level-1-consensus.
Finally we present a theoretical calculation showing that, even in the impartial culture setting, and even when n → ∞, the probability of weak-level-1-consensus approaches a positive constant (in contrast to the probability of level-1-consensus, which approaches 0).
As explained above, the probability that two or more preferences will have exactly the same frequency goes to 0 when n → ∞, so for simplicity we neglect this possibility and assume that each preference relation has a different frequency. Under this assumption, there always exists a unique preference with maximum frequency; let's call it 0 . This is the only candidate for satisfying Condition 1'. Below we calculate the probability that Condition 1' holds for this preference.
For every i ≥ 1, define:
so F i contains the frequencies of all preferences whose distance from 0 is exactly i. Note that
is the maximum possible inversion-distance between two preferences on K alternatives.
Condition 1' is equivalent to the requirement that each integer in F i is larger than each integer in F j , for every i < j. Note that condition 1' does not put any restriction on the 16 frequencies within F i .
Let F := ∪ i F i = the set of frequencies of the K! − 1 preferences different than 0 .
The total number of different orders on F is |F |!. The total number of orders that satisfy
Since all preferences are equally likely, we can assume that all |F |! orders are equally likely. Therefore, the probability that the order of frequencies satisfies Condition 1' is at least:
which is a positive constant that does not approach 0 even when n → ∞.
As an illustration, we calculate the probability of Condition 1' for K = 3 alternatives. In this case we have |F 1 | = 2 and |F 2 | = 2 and |F 3 | = 1 and |F | = 2 + 2 + 1 = 5. Therefore, the probability that Condition 1' is satisfied is at least 2! · 2! · 1!/5! = 1/30 ≈ 0.033. Indeed, in our experiments with φ = 1, the fraction of profiles with weak level-1-consensus was 0.043 for 1000 voters (and at most 0.06 for less than 1000 voters). This is slightly higher than the lower bound of 0.033, which can be explained by the fact that, when n is finite, there is a positive probability for having two profiles with the same frequency.
When K > 3, the probability of Condition 1' in impartial culture is much lower. For example, for K = 4 the lower bound is only about 10 −12 . Indeed, we found no profiles that exhibit weak level-1 consensus in our experiments with φ = 1 and K ≥ 4. However, the probability is still positive and does not approach 0.
VI. REPRODUCIBILITY OF EXPERIMENTS
Our experiments can be reproduced by re-running the code, which is freely available through the following GitHub fork: https://github.com/erelsgl/PrefLib-Tools
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented a practical procedure for checking whether a preference profile exhibits a level-1 consensus. Realizing that this property is highly improbable, we have slightly weakened the condition for a level-1 consensus, proving that it preserves the desirable stability of the social choice. Furthermore, the modified condition is considerably more likely to be satisfied. This was demonstrated synthetically for the impartial culture setting and over a database of real-world preference profiles.
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M.N. is grateful to the Azrieli Foundation for the award of an Azrieli Fellowship. E.S. is grateful to the Israeli Science Foundation for the ISF grant 1083/13. This section provides a formal proof to the following lemma used in subsection III. Proof. Suppose that there exist indices i < j such that Condition 1 is violated for the
. We now prove the lemma by induction on the difference of indices, j − i.
Base:
If j − i = 1, then i and j are already adjacent, so we are done.
Step: Suppose that j − i > 1. We prove that there exists a pair with a smaller difference that violates condition 1. We consider several cases.
Case #1 : i is not the largest index in its equivalence class. i.e, there exists i > i such that µ π ( i ) = µ π ( i ). Then, by the secondary ordering criterion,
condition 1 is violated for the pair i and j .
Case #2 : j is not the smallest index in its equivalence class. i.e, there exists j < j such that µ π ( j ) = µ π ( j ). Then, by the secondary ordering criterion,
Otherwise, i is the largest index in its equivalence class, j is the smallest index in its equivalence class, but still i + 1 < j. This means that the equivalence classes of i and j are not adjacent, i.e, µ π ( i ) > µ π ( i+1 ) > µ π ( j ). Now there are two remaining cases: To show this, we consider all possible pairs-of-alternatives; for each pair, we calculate its contribution to the difference in cardinalities |D( , 0 )| − |D(w ab ( ), 0 )|, and show that the net difference is positive.
• The pair {a, b} is in D( , 0 ) but not in D(w ab ( ), 0 ), so this pair contributes +1
to the difference.
• Any pair that contains neither a nor b is not affected by the switch. I.e, each pair {c, e} where c, e = a, b is in D( , 0 ) if-and-only-if it is in D(w ab ( ), 0 ), so it contributes 0 to the difference.
• Let c be an alternative that is ranked by above b or below a, i.e, either c b a or b a c. Then, the order between c to a and b is not affected by the switch, so {c, a} is in D( , 0 ) if-and-only-if it is in D(w ab ( ), 0 ), and similarly for {c, b}, so it contributes 0 to the difference.
• Let c be an alternative that is ranked by between a and b, i.e, b c a. Then, the switch w ab changes the direction of both the pair {c, a} and the pair {c, b}. We have to calculate how much these two pairs contribute to the difference.
Suppose that the pair {c, a} contributes −1 to the difference. This means that this Similarly, if the pair {c, b} contributes −1 to the difference, then the pair {c, a} contributes +1.
Therefore, the net contribution of the two pairs {c, a} and {c, b} is at least 0.
We proved that the contribution of each pair is at least 0, and the contribution of the pair {a, b} is +1. Therefore, the difference d( , 0 ) − d(w ab ( ), 0 ) is positive and the lemma is proved.
